Early Sunday morning, September 8, a Russian drones flew into Romanian airspace during nighttime attacks on Ukraine’s Danube River ports. Romania flew two F-16s to monitor the situation, according to Romania’s Defense Ministry. A day earlier, an Iranian-type Shahed drone armed with explosives had taken off Belarus to Latvia—which is neither near Ukraine nor in a direct flight path—and crashed near the Latvian city of Rezekne, about 35 miles from the closest section of the Belarusian border. Throughout the war, by accident or design, Russian missiles and bombers have repeatedly violated the airspace of Romania, Latvia, Poland and other NATO members — and attacked alliance territory.
At the end of August, Kiev asked EU and NATO ministers will begin shooting down Russian missiles and drones headed for NATO over Ukraine. At first glance, this looks like a request for NATO to enter the firing line and become a party to the war. For the Biden administration and some allied governments, becoming a direct participant in the war against Russia is the darkest of red lines from the moment that Western intelligence services noticed Moscow’s preparations to invade Ukraine.
Establishing an air defense shield to protect NATO’s own eastern flank, however, does not translate into NATO’s entry into the war. The growing threat could be contained by NATO defending its own territory – while shielding Russian missiles and drones would have the secondary effect of providing much-needed air cover to parts of western Ukraine. Ultimately, a firm decision by NATO to act against repeated violations of its airspace is likely to be de-escalating. That’s because the real risk is allowing Russia to continue to test Western decision-making — and the Kremlin believes it will face no resistance when it escalates.
Land-based air defenses from various NATO member states, including Britain, France, the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and other willing allies, could be deployed in strategic locations with them on the territory of Poland, Slovakia, and Romania. borders with Ukraine. Allied aircraft operating in NATO airspace may also be used. The bloc will conduct shields from fully contiguous territories and airspace, no weapons or troops will be stationed inside Ukraine, and NATO aircraft will not enter Ukrainian airspace. The primary purpose of the air defense shield will be to prevent Russian attack drones and missiles from entering NATO airspace and hitting objects on alliance territory.
Such operations may be undertaken on a bilateral basis or through a coalition of the willing. And it would not be a NATO-wide operation, although Hungary would block any action by the alliance.
have been Regular examples Russia has violated NATO airspace since the beginning of the invasion. Some of these invasions may be accidental. During the first week of the invasion, a drone carrying explosives flew unimpeded in Romanian and Hungarian airspace until crash Next to a student dormitory on the outskirts of Zagreb, the Croatian capital. In November 2022, an S-300 air-defense missile, possibly from Ukraine, was fired at a Russian target. got lost and killed two farmers in Poland.
But other examples don’t seem so accidental. In March, a Russian missile—whose target and flight path were pre-programmed—traveled 39 seconds through Polish airspace before re-entering Ukraine. Some of these incidents appear to be part of a systematic effort by Russia to test NATO’s resolve and decision-making, particularly in light of deliberate Russian incursions in the Baltic Sea region and elsewhere.
This verification is dangerous and comes with a high risk of escalation. Not only could a Russian drone or missile strike NATO territory and potentially kill civilians, but NATO would then have to decide whether to respond to such an attack—invoking Article 5, the collective defense clause that requires alliances. . To defend its members. The more Russia investigates without any NATO response, the greater the risk of an event triggering Article 5.
An air defense shield would be an obvious response to a Russian probe to protect NATO, with the welcome side effect of helping Ukraine. It would signal a more serious posture by Ukraine’s supporters and show that they are ready to regain the strategic initiative rather than merely reacting to events and drawing any red lines for Russia.
For Ukraine, the shield could help provide a degree of security along a corridor running along its western border, where drones and missiles would be stopped by the shield from entering NATO territory. The depth of this corridor will depend on the types and number of air defense assets deployed. It would reduce or eliminate attacks on Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure near the border, such as Danube ports and various electricity substations, transmission lines and gas storage facilities.
It would also mean greater security for Ukrainian businesses and factories operating within the corridor, as well as a degree of humanitarian protection for civilians and civilian infrastructure such as hospitals. Parts of Moldova, which are not in NATO, will also fall within the corridor. The shield will not provide perfect protection everywhere, but it will certainly contribute more than what exists today.
NATO Air Defense Shield along the eastern side of the annex Ukraine will be able to move some of its air defense systems beyond its western border and closer to cities in the east, such as Dnipro and Poltava. This would strengthen Ukrainian air defenses without additional systems, leaving the arsenals of its Western allies.
The main objection to an air defense shield is that it would prove escalating, drawing NATO into direct confrontation with Russia. By shooting down Russian drones and missiles flying over Ukraine, the argument goes, NATO would become a party to the conflict and invite military retaliation by Russia, setting off a devastating Russia-NATO war.
The opposite, however, is more likely to be true.
First, applying air defense cover does not mean shooting down Russian fighter jets and killing Russian pilots. Russia specifically does not fly crewed aircraft into western Ukraine because of the high risk of the Ukrainians shooting them down. Hence, the shield will only target unmanned drones and missiles. For all its huffing and puffing, Moscow would be hard-pressed to make a credible case for retaliating against a country exercising its right of self-defense to shoot down a missile entering its airspace or heading in its direction.
Indeed, one could make a compelling case that NATO border states have an obligation to protect their citizens. Poland’s foreign minister is Radoslaw Sikorski told That they and other countries have a duty to intercept Russian missiles before they enter NATO territory.
Second, the air defense shield is intended to prevent Russian missiles and drones from striking inside the territory of a NATO ally, which could trigger the Article 5 mutual defense clause. In this sense, the shield would actually be de-escalatory in the sense that it would avoid an Article 5-level crisis that could quickly spiral out of control. The ability to regularly breach NATO airspace without Russian reaction undermines the bloc’s deterrence and increases the likelihood that Russia will probe and provoke further.
Ukraine’s partners – particularly the United States and Germany – have imposed strict warnings on Ukraine’s use of Western weapons – including those delivered by Britain or other Western partners – and have shown considerable moderation in their support for Ukraine. According to him, this cautious approach inhibits growth. But the effect has been the opposite: not standing firm and pushing back is an invitation for Russia to embolden, provoke and raise the stakes. Paradoxically, restraint comes with a high risk of escalation.
In indicating that it will continue to push against the West if not deterred, the Kremlin lives up to Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin’s famous strategic adage: “You probe with bayonets: if you find mush, you push. If you get steel, you withdraw.” Air defense shields on NATO’s eastern border can provide that steel.
Will Russia retaliate against a NATO ally for intercepting drones or missiles that could strike its territory? This is highly unlikely. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly shown that he takes Article 5 seriously, and a retaliatory strike against a NATO ally could stretch across the alliance. He will not risk a wider confrontation with NATO that he knows Russia will lose.
Putin will undoubtedly threaten retaliation and escalation As he did To try to prevent the West from delivering tanks, missiles and fighter jets to Ukraine. In each case, when the Allies finally delivered the weapons, Putin’s threats proved hollow. Surprisingly, Western leaders still do not recognize how Putin uses threats to influence Western decision-making toward restraint, self-restraint, and excessive caution.
As Lenin’s saying goes, Russia often retreats when faced with force. Take the case of the Russian Black Sea Fleet: Then Ukraine managed to destroy a third of the fleetincluding its flagship, the Battlecruiser MoscowRussia responded by withdrawing the surviving fleet from the Crimea to get out of range rather than press forward with its attacks. When faced with the choice between retaliation and retreat, Russia chose retreat. Similarly, after Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk—Russia’s first foreign occupation since World War II—Putin chose Play below Instead of increasing the importance of aggression.
When the history books are written about this war, the main lesson will be that an apparently wise but overly cautious approach by the West was a signal to Russia to initiate and expand its war. What appeared to be de-escalator on the western side was in fact escalator, leading to a more brutal and long war. And much of what appeared to be escalatory — such as Ukraine’s attacks on the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which included Western-provided missiles — was in fact de-escalatory.
Until decision-makers in Washington and Berlin understand this, Moscow will push and probe where it can to test NATO’s resolve.
Throughout this war, the West has imposed red lines on itself. Putin has repeatedly threatened escalation and retaliation, but those threats and red lines have proven illusory when put to the test. Providing an air defense shield operating from NATO territory would strengthen the alliance’s deterrence, help Ukraine, and reduce the risk of escalation. It is time for the Western allies to retake the strategic initiative and give Putin a shout-out.
Post NATO frontline states now need air defense shields appeared first foreign policy.